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Abstract A collapse of the West-Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) would cause a sea
level rise of 5–6 m, perhaps even within 100 years, with catastrophic consequences.
The probability of such a collapse is small but increasing with the rise of the
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gas and the resulting climate change. This
paper investigates how the potential collapse of the WAIS affects the optimal rate
of greenhouse gas emission control. We design a decision and learning tree in which
decision are made about emission reduction at regular intervals: the decision makers
(who act as social planners) have to decide whether to implement the environmental
or not (keeping then the flexibility to act later). By investing in the environmental
policy, they determine optimally the date of the optimal emission reduction. At the
same time, they receive new information on the probability of a WAIS collapse and
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the severity of its impacts. The probability of a WAIS collapse is endogenous and
contingent on greenhouse gas concentrations. We solve this optimisation problem
by backward induction. We find that a potential WAIS collapse substantially bring
the date of the optimal emission reduction forward and increases its amount if the
probability is high enough (a probability of 1% per year for the worst case), if the
impacts are high enough (a worst case damage of 10% of GDP for a 3◦C warming)
or if the decision maker is risk averse enough (for example a social damage due to
pollution equal to 1% GDP for an atmospheric temperature of 3◦C). We also find
that, as soon as a WAIS collapse is a foregone fact, emission reduction falls to free
up resource to prepare for adapting to the inevitable. By contrast, adaptation (such
as building dikes along the coast) postpones policy intervention because that strategy
reduces the risk of catastrophic damages.
1 Introduction
The possibility of a catastrophe is one of the main reasons for concern about climate
change (Smith et al. 2001; Wright and Erickson 2003). The climate is a non-linear
system. It may be that the gradual change in the concentrations of greenhouse gases
caused by human activities will bring about abrupt changes in atmosphere, ocean,
or biosphere. Examples include the “runaway” greenhouse effect, in which climate
change triggers massive releases of greenhouse gases (Harvey and Huang 1995), a
shutdown of the thermohaline circulation (Keller et al. 2004; Oppenheimer 1998;
Alley et al. 2003), and the disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS),
the topic of this paper. Although the process of disintegration is slow at a human
time-scale, once it has been set in motion, there is no way of stopping the WAIS
from disintegrating entirely. A WAIS collapse would lead to a sea level rise of
5–6 m, but probably not faster than within the course of one century. A 5-m sea
level rise would have drastic impacts. This paper analyses how the risk of a WAIS
collapse influences the optimal control of carbon dioxide emissions.
Besides the uncertainty about the collapse of the WAIS, we also consider the
uncertainty about the damage costs. Uncertainty interacts with irreversibility, an-
other key feature of climate change decision-making. On the one hand, carbon
dioxide emission reduction is a sunk cost to society. Sunk costs create an opportunity
cost of adopting a policy now rather than waiting for more information about the
impacts of warming and their economic consequences. On the other hand, part of the
atmospheric stock of carbon dioxide is not degradable. Emissions have irreversible
impacts on the atmosphere, and climate change may well have further irreversible
impacts. Adopting an abatement policy now rather than later has a sunk benefit,
because the society is better protected from irreversible environmental damages.
These opportunity costs (benefits) bias traditional cost–benefit analysis against (in
favour) of policy adoption. We investigate which bias is stronger.
In this paper, we limit the response options of decision makers to either doing
nothing (or rather, waiting for more information about the future) or adopting an
environmental policy (i.e. reducing emissions/building dikes such that the probability
of having another catastrophe is equal to zero). We do not distinguish between
reducing emissions and building dikes. We focus on this second question by taking
into account irreversibilities under uncertainties, which modify the traditional cost–
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benefit analysis. We then assume that the reduction quantity is already known, and
that there is an international cooperation in order to reduce emissions: the model
is global and deals with one decision maker who faces international social costs of
warming.
To do so, we use a Real Options model, introduced by Arrow and Fischer
(1974) and Henry (1974). They show that there is a premium or option value on
policies to maintain flexibility. We follow Pindyck (2000, 2002) and Saphores (2004):
irreversibility and environmental uncertainty can strongly influence the timing of
environmental policy. This policy aims to minimize social costs in the presence of
continuous and catastrophic damages. In the set-up of Pindyck (2000, 2002; see also
Dixit and Pindyck 1994,1 and Yin and Newman 1996), the probability of a disaster
only strengthens the discount rate. They show that, if environmental uncertainty in-
creases, an investment in emission reduction should be delayed because of sunk costs.
In contrast, Saphores (2004) shows that acting earlier to reduce GHGs emissions may
be optimal in order to avoid long-term damages due to the GHGs accumulation (i.e.,
sunk benefits).
We choose here to consider this kind of problem by focusing on the report of
IPCC (2001), which highlighted that the extreme weather events have increased
in severity and frequency during the twentieth century as the atmospheric GHGs
concentration has gone up. So our aim is to determine what to decide (i.e. when
to adopt an environmental policy as well as how much GHGs emissions reductions
should be optimal) according to what has already happened. Baranzini et al. (2003)
include the possibility of exogenous climatic shocks into a Real Options model.
Keller et al. (2004) consider uncertainty on the globally averaged temperature for
a doubling of atmospheric CO2 (as well as on damages after the thermohaline
circulation collapse). However, the probability and magnitude of catastrophes are
based on agents’ behaviour, i.e. catastrophic risk is endogenous in this area. In Tsur
and Zemel (1996) and Fisher and Narain (2003), the possibly catastrophic impacts
depend on atmospheric gases concentration, which in turn depend on emissions and
emission control. They also distinguished two kinds of catastrophes (high damage
and low damage). In this paper, we add that the probability of a catastrophe2 depends
on the occurrence of catastrophes in previous periods. In this manner, we simulate
that an extreme climate scenario, in our case the collapse of the West-Antarctic
Ice Sheet, would manifest itself through a series of floods that would increase in
frequency (and intensity) but still be random.
As in Werey (2000), who studies endogenous probabilities of failures of water
hubs, we combine Real Options and Operational Research approaches. We compare
over 100 years social costs when a policy is adopted (and then no catastrophe occurs
anymore) and when nothing is done (and then the society has to cope with possible
disasters that could increase these social costs). We adopt the policy when social costs
are minimized.
1See more precisely Chapters 3 (pp. 85–87), 4 (pp. 112–114) and 6 (pp. 199–204).
2We follow Fisher and Narain (2003, p. 1) to describe a catastrophe: “The increase in global mean
temperature is expected to lead to disruptions in the world’s climate. Whether these disruptions
will cause economic damages and whether these damages will be catastrophic in nature is as yet
uncertain. There are those who believe that global warming will lead to sudden and catastrophic
economic damages. Others believe that damages will be modest”.
196 Climatic Change (2008) 91:193–209
Other papers on catastrophic risks of climate change include Gjerde et al. (1999)
and Baranzini et al. (2003). These papers ignore stochasticity. In return, the repre-
sentation of emission reduction is more sophisticated than what is possible here.
In Section 2 we present the model, hypotheses and data retained. We state results
and the sensitivity analysis in Section 3. We conclude in Section 4.
2 The model and data
2.1 The model
Cost–benefit analysis is a standard framework to evaluate environmental policies,
although by no means the only contender. Our cost–benefit model incorporates three
essential characteristics of the investment problem:
– Irreversibilities: The benefits of an environmental policy are sunk for the society
(due to an immediate adoption), and so are its costs.
– Uncertainties over future outcomes: The evolution of the coupled human-nature
system is uncertain; the evolution of GHGs concentration depends on the
implementation or not of the environmental policy; frequency and magnitude
of disasters are uncertain; social costs of climatic changes are unknown. Finally,
two random events are possible: (mild or bad) catastophy or no catastrophy.
– Delay: The adoption on policy can be delayed. At each point in time, two
decisions are possible: implementing the environmental policy or waiting.
The model aims to adopt a GHGs abatement policy at the optimal time, i.e. when
the social costs are minimized (Pindyck 2000, 2002). This decision is unique and
is not compounded as a series of sequential investment decisions. In contrast to
Werey (2000), we fix a terminal boundary. The policy has to be adopted no later
than year 100.
The information structure of the problem is as follows. There is uncertainty on
social costs and on the probabilities and magnitudes of damages, variables that
depend on the temperature and so on the concentration of greenhouse gases.
Let M(t) denote the stock of environmental pollutants.3 According to Nordhaus
(1994),4 the present stock of pollutant M(t) evolves as:
M (t) = M (0) + βE (t) + (1 − α) [M (t − 1) − M (0)] , (1)
where M(0) = 596.4 billions tons of CO2 is the initial stock of CO2; M(t− 1) is the
stock of CO2 in the previous period; E(t) is emissions of CO2; β is the marginal
atmospheric retention ratio; α is the natural rate at which the stock of CO2 dissipates
over time.
3Note that we use “stock” and “concentration” interchangeably; the two are not the same, but there
is a one-to-one relationship between them. In the model, we use the stock.
4We ignore later, more complicated models of carbon cycle and climate (e.g., Nordhaus and Boyer
2000). We only take carbon dioxide into account.
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World GDP grows over time at a rate of 2% per year. We express social costs,
damages and investment costs in percentage of GDP. Emissions E(t) increase over
time if no policy is implemented:
E (t) = (1 + δ) E (t − 1) , (2a)
with δ = 0.5% or 1% per year. That is, carbon efficiency improves by 1.0% or 1.5%
per year.
When the policy is adopted at time t∗, emissions E(t) are reduced from 0.1% to
1.1%. Then they begin to grow again but at a lower rate than for the baseline
E
(
t∗
) = (1 − η) E (t∗ − 1) , with η ∈ [0.1%; 1.1%] , and (2b)
E (t + 1) = (1 + γ ) E (t) for t > t∗, with γ < δ and γ = 0.1%. (2c)
The costs K of a 1% emission reduction are equal to 0.02% of GDP (Tol 2008).
The climate system is characterized by a multi-layer system comprising the
atmosphere, the mixed layer of oceans and the deep oceans. Nordhaus (1994) models
the evolution of the temperature of the atmosphere and the upper ocean layers by
the following equation:
T (t) = T (t − 1) + σ1
[
f (t) − λT (t − 1)] − σ2 [T (t − 1) − TLO (t − 1)] , (3a)
where σ1 = 1
/
R1 with R1 the thermal capacity of atmosphere and upper oceans;
σ2 = R2
/
τ2 with R2 the thermal capacity of deep oceans and 1
/
τ2 the transfer rate
from the upper layer to the lower layer; λ is the climate feedback parameter;
TLO is the temperature of the deep ocean:
TLO (t) = TLO (t − 1) + σ3 [T (t − 1) − TLO (t − 1)] , (3b)
with σ3 = 1
/
τ2.
The radiative forcing due to carbon dioxide (relative to 1990) follows
f (t) = μ
ln 2
ln
(
M (t)
M (0)
)
with μ = 0.99. (4)
The social costs of warming depend on the temperature (cf. Fisher and Narain 2003).
Climate change brings damages. There are three potential states of nature in each
year: no catastrophe, mild catastrophe and bad catastrophe.
Without a catastrophe, damage costs depend on temperature:
C (t) = cT2. (5)
The parameter c is set such that a warming of 3◦C implies damages equal to 1% of
GDP, which roughly corresponds to the values found in the survey by Smith et al.
(2001). If a mild (bad) catastrophe occurs, the parameter c is multiplied by 3 (11), for
that year. Note that the damage cost convexity can be interpreted as the risk aversion
of society against disasters.
The risk of catastrophic damages is endogenous, in the sense that the probability
of the damages occurring depends on the stock of GHGs, which is endogenous in
our model. Following Fisher and Narain (2003), the probability of the occurrence of
a catastrophe is:
p (t) = (2/(1 + e−b(t)M(t))) − 1. (6)
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The present probability, i.e. for M(0), of a disaster equals 1%. The probability rises
to 5% for 2M(0). So, b(t) evolves over time as
b (t) = b (t − 1) + b (t − 1) M (t) − M (t − 1)
M (t − 1)
log 0.51.5 − 2 log 0.91.1
2 log 0.91.1
. (7)
If p(t) is the probability to have a disaster at time t, then p(t)k(N(t)) is the
probability that this is a bad disaster, where:
k (N (t)) = q + 0.8N (t) , with k (N (t)) ∈ [0; 1] . (8)
The probability of a bad catastrophe increases linearly with the number of bad
catastrophes in the past [N(t), with 0 ≤ N(t) ≤ t]. This is because, once the WAIS
starts to collapse, chances are it will continue. However, a really bad flood may
also just be a freak event. A WAIS collapse would manifest itself by bad floods
becoming ever more common, but the first bad floods are not necessarily a sign that
the WAIS is collapsing.5 Note that [1 - k(N(t))] is the conditional probability of a
mild catastrophe.
Finally, relevant issues on risk-management strategies in the face of uncertain
thresholds are here how (1) the temperature trigger the threshold risk and (2) what
is the threshold specific damage. We assume that the WAIS may collapse without
additional greenhouse gas emissions, but with a very low probability. The threshold
risk and the threshold specific damage are endogenous in this study, increasing with
temperature. Unlike Keller et al. (2004), we do no explicitly consider the uncertainty
about temperatures or CO2 levels. Instead, we include these uncertainties in the
probabilities of the WAIS collapse and the damages.
2.2 Solution
The decision tree has 100 periods, but we present the two periods case for illustration
in Fig. 1. The squares represent decision nodes (adopting a policy P or not NP), and
circles represent stochastic nodes (the occurrence of catastrophes D or not ND).
After adopting a policy, emissions, concentrations and temperatures evolve differ-
ently. CP(t) and CP(t + 1) denote the social costs involved by a policy adopted at time
t. CN P,P(t + 1) are social costs when the policy is only adopted at time (t + 1), CN P(t)
and CN P(t + 1) are social costs when the policy is not adopted. Note that investment
costs K are made at the beginning of the period, so they have to be discounted by the
discount rate r.
Social costs of damages depend on the number of disasters that have already
occurred and that modify the probability of having high damages (which involve
social costs Dh, whereas Dl denotes social costs due to mild damages). So, social
damages after the occurrence of one catastrophe at time t equal
DD (t) = k (t, 1) Dh (t) +
[
1 − k (t, 1)] Dl (t) . (9)
5The detection of early warning signs for a WAIS collapse is an area of active research. The collapse
of ice-shelves (De Angelis and Skarca 2003) or the rapid warming of ocean waters feeding the ice-
shelf cavity may have a much higher signal to noise ratio then the occurrence of floods (p. 5).
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Fig. 1 The sequential decision framework over two periods. We begin by choosing the better
solution at nodes 2 and 3 (evaluated at time t = 0), which is the one that minimizes social costs
occurred in period (t + 1) and after. At node 2:
min Node2
= min
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
K
(
1
1+r
)t + CN P,P(t + 1)
(
1
1+r
)t+1 + . . . ;
[
p (t + 1) (CN P (t + 1) + DDD (t + 1)) + (1 − p (t + 1)) CN P (t + 1)
] ( 1
1+r
)t+1 + . . .
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
.
At node 3:
min Node3
= min
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
K
(
1
1+r
)t + CN P,P (t + 1)
(
1
1+r
)t+1 + . . . ;
[
p (t + 1) (CN P (t + 1) + DD (t + 1)) + (1 − p (t + 1)) CN P (t + 1)
] ( 1
1+r
)t+1 + . . .
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
.
Finally at node 1 (evaluated at time t = 0), decision makers choose between implementing
the policy or waiting at time t according to:
min Node1 = min
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
K
(
1
1+r
)t−1 + CP (t)
(
1
1+r
)t + CP (t + 1)
(
1
1+r
)t+1 + . . . ;
p (t)
[
(CN P (t) + DD (t))
(
1
1+r
)t + min Node2
]
+ (1 − p (t))
[
CN P (t)
(
1
1+r
)t + min Node3
]
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
.
(This equation is the same at time t + 1 when nothing happens at the time t.) Social
damages after the occurrence of a second catastrophe at time (t + 1) when a disaster
has already arrived at time t equal
DDD (t + 1) = k (t + 1, 2) Dh (t + 1) +
[
1 − k (t + 1, 2)] Dl (t + 1) . (10)
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The optimal strategy minimizes expected net present total costs. It is computed
using the algorithm of averaging-out-and-folding-back (which is available upon
request to the authors).
Finally at time t, decision makers choose between implementing the policy or
waiting at time t according to optimal social costs SC*(t) which are the minimum
social costs occurred in period t and after:
SC∗ (t) = min
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
K
(
1
1 + r
)t−1
+
100∑
s=t
(
CP (s)
(
1
1 + r
)s)
;
p (t)
[
(CN P (t) + DD(t))
(
1
1 + r
)t
+ SC∗D (t + 1)
]
+ (1 − p (t))
[
CN P (t)
(
1
1 + r
)t
+ SC∗ (t + 1)
]
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
. (11)
Note that SC∗D (t + 1) are the optimal social costs at (t + 1) when a catastrophe
occurred during the previous period (involving an increase of the probability of a
bad catastrophe, not only due to the increase of atmospheric stock of GHGs).
Depending on the number of catastrophes that have already happened, we can
deduce when it is optimal to choose to invest in an environmental policy: When the
social costs of implementing a policy are less than the social costs of waiting.
We do not evaluate option values here. Option values represent the difference
between results of one shot analysis (i.e. either investing right now or never, result
evaluated by the net present value) and a sequential decision framework. The
decision for the first period is affected by the prospect of future learning about
climatic events. Option values are positive if more development proceeds with more
complete information than without it. We know that in case of options to invest,
option values are always positive even with risk aversion (cf. Pindyck 2000). It is
worth taking into account the arrival of information to the future. See for example
Schimmelpfennig (1995) who evaluates option values in a two periods framework of
two possible choices.
2.3 Data and parameters
We calibrate our model on the basis of hypotheses and results obtained by Nordhaus
(1994), Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), Tol (2002a, b) and Fisher and Narain (2003).
See Table 1.
3 Results
Table 2 shows the optimal time of investment as a function of the number of
catastrophes occurring. For comparison, Table 2 also displays the marginal, net
present cost of waiting and policy implementation. Decision makers start choosing
between implementation and waiting for further information at t = 0. At the optimal
time t*, the costs of implementing an environmental policy are always lower than
costs of waiting.
Costs fall if the number of catastrophes decreases, which has as a result to
postpone the implement of the environmental policy. If no catastrophe occurs, it is
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Table 1 Parameters, values, and sources
Parameters Initial values References
Initial atmospheric stock and emissions of GHGs, initial temperatures
Initial atmospheric stock of greenhouse gases 785.3 Fisher and Narain (2003)
M(0) (billions tons of CO2 equivalent)
Initial emissions E(0) (billions tons 6.1587 Nordhaus and Boyer (2000)
of CO2 equivalent)
Initial atmospheric temperature 0.58 Fisher and Narain (2003)
T(0) (Celsius degrees)
Initial ocean temperature TLO(0) 0.07 Fisher and Narain (2003)
(Celsius degrees)
Present atmospheric stock of GHGs M (t) = M (0) + βE (t) + (1 − α) [M (t − 1) − M (0)]
Natural rate α (between 0 and 1) at which the 0.02 Nordhaus (1994)
stock of CO2 dissipates over time
Marginal atmospheric retention ratio β 0.9 Nordhaus (1994)
Emissions
Emissions growth rate δ, E (t) = (1 + δ) E (t − 1) 0.005 This study
If an environmental policy is implemented at t*: This study
Rate of emissions reduction η, 0.011
E (t∗) = (1 − η) E (t∗ − 1)
Then emissions increase at a lower rate 0.001
γ < δ, E (t + 1) = (1 + γ ) E (t) for t > t*
Temperatures
Temperature parameters of the atmosphere,
T (t) = T (t − 1) + σ1
[
f (t) − λT (t − 1)]
− σ2 [T (t − 1) − TLO (t − 1)]
σ 1 0.1 Nordhaus (1994)
σ 2 0.1 Nordhaus (1994)
Temperature parameters of the upper ocean layers,
TLO (t) = TLO (t − 1) + σ3 [T (t − 1) − TLO (t − 1)]
and f (t) = μln 2 ln
(
M(t)
M(0)
)
σ 3 0.1 Nordhaus (1994)
λ 0.1 Nordhaus (1994)
μ 0.99 Nordhaus (1994)
Costs
Costs of a policy adoption K (% GDP) 0.02 Tol (2008)
for 1% emissions reduction
Parameter c of social costs of pollution 0.001 Nordhaus (1994)
C(t) = cT2 (1% GDP when T = 3)
Damage costs
Parameter h of C(t)=hT2 (10% GDP when T = 3) 0.01 This study
Parameter l of C(t)=hT2 (2% GDP when T = 3) 0.002 This study
Initial parameters of probabilities of catastrophes
Initial probability of a WAIS collapse [p(0).q], 0.01 This study
i.e. for M(0), of a disaster equals 1%
Initial probability of a disaster, p(0) 0.1 This study
Initial probability q that this disaster provokes 0.1 This study
a high-costly damage
Others parameters
Discount rate r (%) 5 This study
GNP growth rate gnp 0.02 This study
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better to wait until time t = 100. That is, catastrophes are the main reason for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions in our model.
The optimal time to implement a policy is equal to the 59th year when 59
catastrophes have already occurred; to the 58th year when 57 or 56 catastrophes have
already occurred; and to the 59th year with 56, 55 or 54 previous catastrophes. This is
due to the probability of having a catastrophe, which is a concave function between
0 and 1. When catastrophes are very numerous, the probability of having another
one is very similar regardless of the exact number of previous catastrophes. There-
fore, the costs of waiting can be lower than the costs of implementing a policy (which
takes into account the capital costs). Decision makers can invest later (at t* = 59
instead 58).
However, generally, emission reduction is postponed to later periods if fewer
catastrophes occur. The earliest time for abatement is after 58 years, which is
relatively late. Therefore, emission reduction is not used to prevent a WAIS collapse,
but only to reduce damages. Emission reduction delays WAIS collapse, but does not
avoid it. This is similar to the case of low thermohaline circulation collapse damages
in Keller et al. (2004). This effect is due to the choice of damage representation. If
the unlikely, bad catastrophe is avoided, then the less unlikely mild catastrophe could
still occur. And if that one is avoided too, then there are still the impacts of regular
climate change. Combined with exogenous probabilities, the expected damage is
continuous too.
Table 3 contains the results of a sensitivity analysis. Emission reduction is im-
plemented earlier if (1) the costs of emission abatement are lower and (2) the time
horizon is shorter. If emissions grow faster, less catastrophes are needed to induce
implementation.
Uncertainty gives rise to two different issues. One issue relates to risk aversion.
The fact that one cannot undo past emission reduction or actively completely
remove carbon from the atmosphere is irrelevant to the optimal regulatory strategy
(Kolstad 1996). The other issue relates to uncertainty where that uncertainty is being
resolved over time, i.e. information is being acquired over time. The literature on
irreversibilities tells us that with learning, we should avoid decisions that restrict
future options.
The results obtained with the assumption of risk aversion show that an environ-
mental policy involves two kinds of irreversibilities that work in opposite directions:
– Sunk costs associated with an environment regulation: policies aimed at reducing
ecological damage impose sunk costs on society;
– Sunk benefits of avoided environmental degradation: environmental damage can
be partially or totally irreversible. So adopting a policy now rather than waiting
has a sunk benefit (a negative opportunity cost).
When there is no GDP growth over time, implementation is earlier. A higher
discount rate implies earlier implementation. Note that lower (or no) economic
growth and a higher (consumption) discount rate are equivalent. A higher discount
rate implies reduced care for the future. The higher preference for the present is
equivalent to a lower value for the future, i.e. a lower value of waiting for more
information. Finally, the option value decreases and decision makers invest earlier.
Emission reductions are implemented earlier.
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Table 3 Sensitivity analysis
Variations of Impact on the optimal timea Present value of
parameters t∗ of implementing the policy implementing the policy
compared to t∗ = 59 (with 0 period at time t∗
without any catastrophe) (in % of GDP)
Emissions
Emissions growth rate δ = 0.005, E(t) = (1 + δ)E(t − 1)
0.6% (>) < >
t∗ = 58
58–56 catastrophes, which means
0–2 periods without any catastrophe
0.8% < >
t∗ = 58
58–55 catastrophes, which means
0–3 periods without any catastrophe
1% < >
t∗ = 58
58–54 catastrophes, which means
0–4 periods without any catastrophe
1.1% < <
t∗ = 58
58 catastrophes, which means 0 period
without any catastrophe
1.4% < <
t∗ = 58
58 catastrophes, which means 0 period
without any catastrophe
Intensity of emissions reduction: η = 0.011, E(t*) = (1 − η)E(t* − 1)
0.1% (<) = >
3.526846
0.2% = >
3.526610
0.3% = >
3.526373
0.4% = >
3.526137
0.5% = >
3.525900
0.6% = >
3.525664
0.7% = >
3.525427
0.8% = >
3.525190
0.9% = >
3.524954
1.0% = >
3.524717
1.2% (>) = <
3.524243
1.3% = <
3.524006
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Table 3 (continued)
Variations of Impact on the optimal timea Present value of
parameters t∗ of implementing the policy implementing the policy
compared to t∗ = 59 (with 0 period at time t∗
without any catastrophe) (in % of GDP)
Emissions growth rate γ = 0.001<δ after implementing the policy, E(t+1) = (1+γ )E(t) for t > t∗
0.0005 (<) < <
t∗ = 58
58–56 catastrophes, which means
0–2 periods without any catastrophe
0.002 (>) = >
0.005 (>) = >
t∗ = 59
59–55 catastrophes, which means
0–4 periods without any catastrophe
No emissions reduction η = 0 and same emissions growth rate γ = δ = 0.005
Only dikesb > <
t∗ = 85 1.179251
85–84 catastrophes, which means
0–1 periods without any catastrophe
Costs
Costs of a policy adoption K = 0.02 (% GDP) for 1% emissions reduction
0.001% (<) < <
t∗ = 58
58–56 catastrophes, which means
0–2 periods without any catastrophe
0.01% (<) = <
0.1% (>) = >
1% (>) > >
Risk neutrality: parameter c of social costs of pollution C(t) = cT (1% GDP when T = 3)
0.003 < >
Catastrophes
No catastrophe > <
at all, p(t) = 0 t∗ = 85 1.16760
85–83 catastrophes, which means
0–2 periods without any catastrophe
No slide of the > <
WAIS, k(N(t)) = 0, t∗ = 85 1.171848
∀N(t) the number of 85–83 catastrophes, which means
previous catastrophes 0–2 periods without any catastrophe
Probability of a bad catastrophe q [with k(1) = 0.9 and k(2) = 1]
0.05 (<) = <
0.15 (>) < <
t* = 58
58–56 catastrophes, which means
0–2 periods without any catastrophe
Probability of a bad catastrophe q [and k(1), k(2) are adjusted]
0.05 [<; k(1) = 0.85 = =
and k(2) = 1]
0.15 [>; k(1) = 0.95 < >
and k(2) = 1] t∗ = 58
58–56 catastrophes, which means
0–2 periods without any catastrophe
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Table 3 (continued)
Variations of Impact on the optimal timea Present value of
parameters t∗ of implementing the policy implementing the policy
compared to t∗ = 59 (with 0 period at time t∗
without any catastrophe) (in % of GDP)
Evolution of the probability of a bad catastrophe according to previous catastrophes: k(1) and k(2)
k(1) = 0.8 (<) and k(2) = 1 = =
k(1) = 1 (>) and k(2) = 1 = >
t∗ = 59
59–58 catastrophes, which means
0–1 periods without any catastrophe
Others parameters
Discount rate r = 5%
4% (<) > >
8% (>) < <
GNP growth rate gnp = 0.02
0, no GNP growth, (<) < <
t* = 46 1.286666
46–43 catastrophes, which means
0–3 periods without any catastrophe
4% (>) > >
t∗ = 70 12.519976
70–64 catastrophes, which means
0–6 periods without any catastrophe
No GNP growth and
a lower discount < <
rate (r = 4%) t∗ = 52 2.051516
52–50 catastrophes, which means
0–2 periods without any catastrophe
A higher discount < <
rate (r = 6%) t∗ = 40 0.883048
40–39 catastrophes, which means
0–1 periods without any catastrophe
Number of periods, T = 100, of the decision tree
95 (<) < <
t∗ = 57
57–53 catastrophes, which means
0–4 periods without any catastrophe
105 (>) > >
Signs >, <, = are used to show that the parameter, the optimal time or the value of implementing the
policy is higher, lower or equal than in the base case.
aIn the “worst” cases, i.e. when (t∗ − x) previous catastrophes have already occurred (which means
0 − x periods without any catastrophe).
bOnly building dikes means that there is neither emission reduction nor different growth path after
implementing the policy. Note that here we conserve the same capital costs as for implementing a
policy to reduce 1.1% of emissions.
Table 3 also shows that, if there are no catastrophes or if the catastrophes are not
serially correlated (that is, no WAIS collapse), emission reduction is postponed. That
is, the possibility of a WAIS collapse increases optimal emission reduction.
Emission reduction is postponed too, if the policy intervention is adaptation (dike
building) rather than mitigation (emission reduction). This is because mitigation
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would reduce the probability of catastrophes as well as non-catastrophic damages,
whereas adaptation would reduce the damage due to catastrophes only. For more
details about plausible responses (more exactly according to the cost and/or the
political feasibility of adaptation as compared to emission reductions) to the threat
of rapid sea-level rise, see Lonsdale et al. (2008) for the Thames estuary, Poumadère
et al. (2008) for the Rhone delta, and Olsthoorn et al. (2008) for the Rhine delta.
Finally, Table 3 shows that the date of implementation is independent of the
intensity of emission reduction. However, social costs decrease with higher emission
reduction. The base case policy of Table 2 may be optimal in the timing, but not in
the level of emission abatement.
4 Concluding remarks
We use a stylized model of the costs and benefits of emission reduction, with large
and endogenous uncertainty, with irreversible emission reduction and irreversible
climate change impacts, to assess the optimal timing of policy. This was done before.
However, we introduce serial correlation into the stochastic process that generates
catastrophes, increasing the irreversibility on the climate change impact side. In this
manner, we approximate the effects of a possible collapse of the West-Antarctic Ice
Sheet.
We confirm the findings of previous studies that catastrophic risks justify green-
house gas emission reduction. We extend that result to show that catastrophic
scenarios (here represented as serially correlated catastrophic risks) justify even
greater emission reduction.
The model used is highly stylised. One improvement would be to include tech-
nological progress. If endogenous and irreversible—both reasonable assumptions—
the model dynamics would be more complicated still, and the results may differ.
Other improvements include a better parameterisation of the model and a more
realistic representation of the physical and economic processes. A greater intellectual
challenge is to merge our approach, which emphasizes stochasticity, sunk costs and
the timing of policy but has a static and discrete representation of emission reduction,
with the alternative school of decision making under catastrophic risk (e.g., Keller
et al. 2004), which has dynamic and continuous emission reduction but downplays
stochasticity, sunk costs and timing.
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